Simion, Mona (2024) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108 (1). pp. 203-216. ISSN 0031-8205

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Abstract

This article develops and defends a full account of the nature and normativity of resistance to evidence, according to which resistance to evidence is an instance of input-level epistemic malfunctioning. At the core of this epistemic normative picture lies the notion of knowledge indicators, as evidential probability increasing facts that one is in a position to know; resistance to evidence is construed as a failure to uptake knowledge indicators.

Information
Title Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe
Creators Simion, Mona
Identification Number 10.1111/phpr.12964
Date January 2024
Subjects B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher Wiley
Library
URI https://pub.demo35.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/403
Item Type Article
Depositing User Unnamed user with email ejo1f20@soton.ac.uk
Date Deposited 11 Jun 2025 16:38
Revision 58
Last Modified 12 Jun 2025 09:26
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