Kemp, Gary (2024) Quine, evidence, and our science. Philosophical Studies, 181 (5). pp. 961-976. ISSN 0031-8116
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The article discusses W.V.O. Quine's struggle to define observation sentences and categoricals, particularly within his commitment to naturalism.AI Topics:
As is reasonably well-appreciated, Quine struggled with his definition of the all-important notion of an observation sentence; especially in order to make them bear out his commitment to language’s being a ‘social art’. In an earlier article (Mind 131(523):805–825, 2022), I proposed a certain repair, which here I will explain, justify and articulate further. But it also infects the definition of observation categoricals, and furthermore makes it a secondary matter, a seeming afterthought, that evidence, science and knowledge generally are shared—are joint, social and collaborative products. Without forsaking Quine’s strict naturalism, I try to make the necessary adjustments to Quine’s scheme.
Kemp, Gary
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Kemp, Gary (2024) Quine’s Tarskian angle on truth: immanence, semantic ascent and the importance of generality. Philosophers' Imprint, 24 (1). pp. 1-16. ISSN 1533-628X
Kemp, Gary (2024) Quine, evidence, and our science. Philosophical Studies, 181 (5). pp. 961-976. ISSN 0031-8116
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