Kemp, Gary (2024) Quine, evidence, and our science. Philosophical Studies, 181 (5). pp. 961-976. ISSN 0031-8116
AI Summary:
The article discusses W.V.O. Quine's struggle to define observation sentences and categoricals, particularly within his commitment to naturalism.AI Topics:
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.
Download (551kB)
As is reasonably well-appreciated, Quine struggled with his definition of the all-important notion of an observation sentence; especially in order to make them bear out his commitment to language’s being a ‘social art’. In an earlier article (Mind 131(523):805–825, 2022), I proposed a certain repair, which here I will explain, justify and articulate further. But it also infects the definition of observation categoricals, and furthermore makes it a secondary matter, a seeming afterthought, that evidence, science and knowledge generally are shared—are joint, social and collaborative products. Without forsaking Quine’s strict naturalism, I try to make the necessary adjustments to Quine’s scheme.
Title | Quine, evidence, and our science |
---|---|
Creators | Kemp, Gary |
Identification Number | 10.1007/s11098-024-02116-8 |
Date | 20 March 2024 |
Divisions | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Publisher | Springer |
URI | https://pub.demo35.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/325 |
---|
Item Type | Article |
---|---|
Depositing User | Unnamed user with email ejo1f20@soton.ac.uk |
Date Deposited | 11 Jun 2025 16:37 |
Revision | 27 |
Last Modified | 12 Jun 2025 09:50 |
![]() |