Gordon, Emma C. (2024) Cognitive enhancement, hyperagency, and responsibility explosion. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 49 (5). pp. 488-498. ISSN 0360-5310

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Abstract

Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to Sandel (2009)—viz., that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an “explosion” of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument.

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