Gordon, Emma C. (2024) Cognitive enhancement, hyperagency, and responsibility explosion. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 49 (5). pp. 488-498. ISSN 0360-5310
AI Summary:
The paper discusses a prominent objection to cognitive enhancement, known as the hyperagency objection. This objection argues that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control.AI Topics:
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Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to Sandel (2009)—viz., that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an “explosion” of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument.
Title | Cognitive enhancement, hyperagency, and responsibility explosion |
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Creators | Gordon, Emma C. |
Identification Number | 10.1093/jmp/jhae025 |
Date | October 2024 |
Divisions | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
URI | https://pub.demo35.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/139 |
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Item Type | Article |
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Depositing User | Unnamed user with email ejo1f20@soton.ac.uk |
Date Deposited | 11 Jun 2025 16:35 |
Revision | 21 |
Last Modified | 12 Jun 2025 11:28 |
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